

Online Appendix for “Fear of Campaign Violence and Support for Democracy and Autocracy”

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Appendix A: Summary Statistics and Question Wording

Table A.I: Summary Statistics Individual Level

Variable	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Panel A: Outcomes						
Prefer Democracy	1	0.787	0.410	0	1	52659
Extent of Democracy	0.66	0.617	0.288	0	1	52659
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.75	0.661	0.249	0	1	52659
Trust in Political Institutions	0.67	0.578	0.329	0	1	52659
Turnout	1	0.737	0.440	0	1	52659
Single-Party Rule	0	0.219	0.306	0	1	52332
Personalist Rule	0	0.168	0.252	0	1	52015
Military Rule	0	0.218	0.300	0	1	52047
Past Autocratic Form of Government	0	0.201	0.289	0	1	49422
Elections	0	0.910	0.123	0.5	1	52490
Multiple Parties	0.75	0.653	0.377	0	1	52400
Parliamentary Accountability	0.75	0.646	0.383	0	1	52110
Opposition Criticism	1	0.887	0.131	0.5	1	52344
Media Criticism	1	0.884	0.132	0.5	1	52162
Parliamentary Primacy	0.75	0.846	0.156	0.5	1	51527
Rule of Law	0.75	0.678	0.349	0	1	51785
Term Limits	1	0.897	0.133	0.5	1	52185
Panel B: Treatment and Placebo						
Fear of Campaign Violence	0	0.749	1.039	0	3	52659
Fear of Crime	0	0.512	0.876	0	3	52553
Panel C: Socio-Economic Controls						
Age	35	37.664	14.659	18	110	52659
Age ²	1225	1633.431	1314.063	324	12100	52659
Male	1	0.527	0.499	0	1	52659
Rural	1	0.553	0.497	0	1	52659
Poverty Index	1	1.061	0.970	0	4	52659
Education	3	2.464	1.676	0	6	52659
Employment	1	1.640	0.869	1	3	52659
Panel D: Political Controls						
Incumbent Partisan	0	0.353	0.478	0	1	52659
Opposition Partisan	0	0.256	0.436	0	1	52659
Non-Partisan	0	0.391	0.488	0	1	52659
Community Membership	0	0.664	0.956	0	3	52659
Community Meeting Attendance	2	2.080	1.319	0	4	52659
Interest in Public Affairs	2	1.778	1.090	0	3	52659
Newspaper	0	1.125	1.489	0	4	52659
Radio	4	3.032	1.380	0	4	52659
TV	3	2.103	1.799	0	4	52659

Table A.II: Question Wording from Afrobarometer

Variable Name	Question Wording: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2...
Elections	Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections. Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.
Multiple Parties	Statement 1: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in [country]. Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make sure that [country citizens] have real choices in who governs them.
Parliamentary Accountability	Statement 1: Parliament should ensure that the President explains to it on a regular basis how his/her government spends taxpayers' money. Statement 2: The President should be able to devote his/her full attention to developing the country rather than wasting time justifying his actions.
Opposition Criticism	Statement 1: Opposition parties should regularly examine and criticize government policies and actions. Statement 2: Opposition parties should concentrate on cooperating with government and helping it develop the country.
Media Criticism	Statement 1: The news media should constantly investigate and report on corruption and the mistakes made by the government. Statement 2: Too much reporting on negative events, like corruption, only harms the country.
Parliamentary Primacy	Statement 1: Members of Parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree. Statement 2: Since the President represents all of us, he/she should pass laws without worrying about what Parliament thinks.
Rule of Law	Statement 1: Since the President was elected to lead the country, he/she should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong. Statement 2: The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he/she thinks they are wrong.
Term Limits	Statement 1: The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office. Statement 2: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve.

Appendix B: Tables to Figures 1-3

Table B.I: Fear of Campaign Violence on Attitudinal and Behavioral Support for Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Prefer Democracy (mean=0.79, sd=0.41)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.018*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.048	0.054	0.062
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel B: Extent of Democracy (mean=0.62, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.023*** (0.001)	-0.022*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.078	0.090	0.110
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel C: Satisfied with Democracy (mean=0.66, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.019*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.083	0.097	0.128
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel D: Trust in Political Institutions (mean=0.58, sd=0.33)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.082	0.104	0.163
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel E: Turnout (mean=0.74, sd=0.44)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.047	0.169	0.193
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Table B.II: Fear of Campaign Violence on Support for Institutional Features of Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Elections (mean=0.91, sd=0.12)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.036	0.040	0.044
Observations	52490	52490	52490
Clusters	9201	9201	9201
Panel B: Multiple Parties (mean=0.66, sd=0.38)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.035	0.040	0.043
Observations	52400	52400	52400
Clusters	9199	9199	9199
Panel C: Parliamentary Accountability (mean=0.65, sd=0.38)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.051	0.056	0.057
Observations	52110	52110	52110
Clusters	9187	9187	9187
Panel D: Opposition Criticism (mean=0.89, sd=0.13)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.034	0.036	0.040
Observations	52344	52344	52344
Clusters	9201	9201	9201

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Table B.II – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel E: Media Criticism (mean=0.89, sd=0.13)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.032	0.036	0.039
Observations	52162	52162	52162
Clusters	9183	9183	9183
Panel F: Parliamentary Primacy (mean=0.85, sd=0.16)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.002** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.041	0.043	0.045
Observations	51527	51527	51527
Clusters	9163	9163	9163
Panel G: Rule of Law (mean=0.68, sd=0.35)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.015	0.020	0.021
Observations	51785	51785	51785
Clusters	9177	9177	9177
Panel H: Term Limits (mean=0.90, sd=0.13)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.001** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.050	0.055	0.058
Observations	52185	52185	52185
Clusters	9188	9188	9188

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Table B.III: Fear of Campaign Violence on Support for Past Autocratic Form of Government

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Single-Party Rule (mean=0.22, sd=0.31)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.042	0.073	0.080
Observations	26213	26213	26213
Clusters	4579	4579	4579
Panel B: Personalist Rule (mean=0.17, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.019	0.030	0.035
Observations	20789	20789	20789
Clusters	3807	3807	3807
Panel C: Military Rule (mean=0.22, sd=0.30)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.023*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.014	0.030	0.036
Observations	2420	2420	2420
Clusters	497	497	497
Panel D: Past Autocratic Form of Government (mean=0.20, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.007*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.044	0.063	0.068
Observations	49422	49422	49422
Clusters	8870	8870	8870

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Appendix C: Additional Analyses

Table C.I: Sensitivity Analysis Using Oster's (2019) Coefficient Stability Test

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Baseline (std.); [R ²]	Full Model (std.); [R ²]	Identified set given R ² _{max}	$ \tilde{\delta} $ for $\beta = 0$ given R ² _{max}
Panel A: Attitudinal and Behavioral Support for Democracy				
Prefer Democracy	-0.018 (0.002); [0.003]	-0.018 (0.002); [0.062]	(-0.018; -0.019)	50.12
Extent of Democracy	-0.028 (0.001); [0.022]	-0.022 (0.001); [0.110]	(-0.022; -0.019)	5.54
Satisfaction with Democracy	-0.022 (0.001); [0.016]	-0.019 (0.001); [0.128]	(-0.019; -0.018)	9.39
Trust in Political Institutions	-0.020 (0.002); [0.016]	-0.013 (0.001); [0.163]	(-0.013; -0.010)	4.13
Turnout	-0.015 (0.002); [0.006]	-0.006 (0.002); [0.193]	(-0.006; -0.002)	1.33
Panel B: Support for Autocratic Government Forms				
Single-Party Rule	0.003 (0.002); [0.002]	0.007 (0.002); [0.080]	(0.008; 0.007)	5.27
Personalist Rule	0.002 (0.002); [0.000]	0.005 (0.002); [0.035]	(0.006; 0.005)	3.55
Military Rule	0.023 (0.005); [0.014]	0.021 (0.005); [0.036]	(0.019; 0.021)	6.69
Past Autocratic Government	0.005 (0.001); [0.001]	0.007 (0.001); [0.068]	(0.008; 0.007)	10.61

Notes: Table shows the fear of election violence estimates for the baseline model (only including survey round fixed effects) in column 1, and for the country-fixed effects model with all socio-economic and political controls in column 2. The identified set of coefficient estimates for $\delta = 1$ and R_{\max}^2 are shown in column 3, and the $|\tilde{\delta}|$ estimates for the fear coefficient estimate to be zero given R_{\max}^2 are shown in column 4. This indicates how much stronger selection on unobservables would have to be for the fear of campaign violence estimate to equal zero given R_{\max}^2 . Throughout our analysis we set $R_{\max}^2 = 1.5R_{\max}^2$ full controls, which is higher and therefore more restrictive than the 1.25 multiplier Oster (2019, 200) suggests.

Table C.II: Replicating Tables B.I and B.III with District Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Prefer Democracy (mean=0.79, sd=0.41)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.018*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.113	0.118	0.125
Observations	51241	51241	51241
Clusters	8999	8999	8999
Panel B: Extent of Democracy (mean=0.62, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.019*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.162	0.170	0.181
Observations	51241	51241	51241
Clusters	8999	8999	8999
Panel C: Satisfied with Democracy (mean=0.66, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.166	0.176	0.196
Observations	51241	51241	51241
Clusters	8999	8999	8999
Panel D: Trust in Political Institutions (mean=0.58, sd=0.33)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.202	0.213	0.251
Observations	51241	51241	51241
Clusters	8999	8999	8999
Panel E: Turnout (mean=0.74, sd=0.44)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.115	0.224	0.244
Observations	51241	51241	51241
Clusters	8999	8999	8999

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Table C.II: – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel F: Single-Party Rule (mean=0.22, sd=0.31)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.008*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.139	0.160	0.167
Observations	25622	25622	25622
Clusters	4515	4515	4515
Panel G: Personalist Rule (mean=0.17, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.008*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.098	0.105	0.109
Observations	20789	20789	20789
Clusters	3807	3807	3807
Panel H: Military Rule (mean=0.22, sd=0.30)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.018*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.006)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.011	0.028	0.038
Observations	1610	1610	1610
Clusters	349	349	349
Panel I: Past Autocratic Form of Government (mean=0.20, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.008*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.131	0.144	0.148
Observations	48021	48021	48021
Clusters	8659	8659	8659

Notes: All regressions include district and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Table C.III: Replicating Tables B.I and B.III with Matching

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Prefer Democracy (mean=0.76, sd=0.43)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.057* (0.032)	-0.058* (0.031)	-0.058** (0.027)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.362	0.572	0.701
Observations	128	128	128
Clusters	124	124	124
Panel B: Extent of Democracy (mean=0.58, sd=0.28)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.022)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.382	0.463	0.511
Observations	128	128	128
Clusters	124	124	124
Panel C: Satisfied with Democracy (mean=0.62, sd=0.27)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.054*** (0.016)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.452	0.564	0.634
Observations	128	128	128
Clusters	124	124	124
Panel D: Trust in Political Institutions (mean=0.59, sd=0.33)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.060*** (0.021)	-0.064*** (0.021)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.465	0.530	0.634
Observations	128	128	128
Clusters	124	124	124
Panel E: Turnout (mean=0.65, sd=0.48)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.043 (0.031)	-0.045 (0.029)	-0.048* (0.027)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.312	0.572	0.640
Observations	128	128	128
Clusters	124	124	124

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Table C.III: – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel I: Past Autocratic Form of Government (mean=0.20, sd=0.27)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.011 (0.017)	0.008 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.173	0.269	0.383
Observations	121	121	121
Clusters	117	117	117

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Panels F-H are not added because the sample size of the sub-samples after matching is small.

Figure C.I: Heterogeneity Across Countries in Terms of Estimated Coefficients
(replicating Figure 1 models with all controls)




Figure C.II: Heterogeneity Across Countries in Terms of Fear




Table C.IV: Replicating Tables B.I and B.III with Control for Perceived Survey Sponsor

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Prefer Democracy (mean=0.79, sd=0.41)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.018*** (0.002)
Survey Sponsor Government	-0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.048	0.054	0.062
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel B: Extent of Democracy (mean=0.62, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.023*** (0.001)	-0.022*** (0.001)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.022*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.080	0.090	0.110
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel C: Satisfied with Democracy (mean=0.66, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.019*** (0.001)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.020*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.085	0.098	0.128
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel D: Trust in Political Institutions (mean=0.58, sd=0.33)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.001)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.042*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.026*** (0.003)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.086	0.106	0.165
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel E: Turnout (mean=0.74, sd=0.44)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.028*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.048	0.169	0.193
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210

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Table C.IV: – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel F: Single-Party Rule (mean=0.22, sd=0.31)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.024*** (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.044	0.073	0.080
Observations	26213	26213	26213
Clusters	4579	4579	4579
Panel G: Personalist Rule (mean=0.17, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.007* (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.020	0.030	0.035
Observations	20789	20789	20789
Clusters	3807	3807	3807
Panel H: Military Rule (mean=0.22, sd=0.30)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.024*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)
Survey Sponsor Government	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.014)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.015	0.031	0.037
Observations	2420	2420	2420
Clusters	497	497	497
Panel I: Past Autocratic Form of Government (mean=0.20, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	0.007*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.015*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.044	0.063	0.068
Observations	49422	49422	49422
Clusters	8870	8870	8870

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Table C.V: Replicating Tables B.I and B.III with Interaction between Perceived Survey Sponsor and Fear

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Prefer Democracy (mean=0.79, sd=0.41)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)
Survey Sponsor Government	-0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Survey Sponsor Government × Fear of Campaign Violence	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.048	0.054	0.062
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel B: Extent of Democracy (mean=0.62, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.025*** (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.022*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)
Survey Sponsor Government × Fear of Campaign Violence	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.080	0.090	0.110
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel C: Satisfied with Democracy (mean=0.66, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.024*** (0.001)	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.016*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)
Survey Sponsor Government × Fear of Campaign Violence	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.085	0.098	0.129
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel D: Trust in Political Institutions (mean=0.58, sd=0.33)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.041*** (0.004)	0.031*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)
Survey Sponsor Government × Fear of Campaign Violence	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.086	0.106	0.165
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel E: Turnout (mean=0.74, sd=0.44)			
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Survey Sponsor Government	0.031*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.004)
Survey Sponsor Government × Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.048	0.169	0.193
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Table C.VI: Does Fearing Campaign Violence Influence Response Rates?

	(1)	(2)
	Answer (mean=0.83, sd=0.37)	
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)
Socio-Economic and Political Controls	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.051	0.122
Observations	68804	61917
Clusters	9684	9563

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Table C.VII: Fear of Crime on Support for Democracy and Autocracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Prefer Democracy (mean=0.79, sd=0.41)			
Fear of Crime	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.046	0.052	0.060
Observations	52553	52553	52553
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel B: Extent of Democracy (mean=0.62, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Crime	-0.024*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.076	0.087	0.107
Observations	52553	52553	52553
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel C: Satisfied with Democracy (mean=0.66, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Crime	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.080	0.094	0.125
Observations	52553	52553	52553
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel D: Trust in Political Institutions (mean=0.58, sd=0.33)			
Fear of Crime	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.082	0.102	0.163
Observations	52553	52553	52553
Clusters	9210	9210	9210
Panel E: Turnout (mean=0.74, sd=0.44)			
Fear of Crime	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.047	0.169	0.193
Observations	52553	52553	52553
Clusters	9210	9210	9210

Continued on next page

Table C.VII: – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel F: Single-Party Rule (mean=0.22, sd=0.31)			
Fear of Crime	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.042	0.073	0.080
Observations	26175	26175	26175
Clusters	4579	4579	4579
Panel G: Personalist Rule (mean=0.17, sd=0.25)			
Fear of Crime	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.019	0.030	0.034
Observations	20727	20727	20727
Clusters	3807	3807	3807
Panel H: Military Rule (mean=0.22, sd=0.30)			
Fear of Crime	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.007	0.023	0.030
Observations	2417	2417	2417
Clusters	497	497	497
Panel I: Past Autocratic Government (mean=0.20, sd=0.29)			
Fear of Crime	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.043	0.063	0.067
Observations	49319	49319	49319
Clusters	8870	8870	8870

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Figure C.III: Scatterplot of Events of Election Violence and Respondents' Fear of Election Violence, by District




Table C.VIII: Validating the Fear Measure with Events

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Fear of Campaign Violence (mean=0.75, sd=1.04)			
ECAV event in district	0.159*** (0.058)	0.156*** (0.058)	0.153*** (0.058)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.148	0.156	0.158
Observations	31241	31241	31241
Clusters	5520	5520	5520
Panel B: Fear of Campaign Violence (mean=0.75, sd=1.04)			
ECAV event in district	0.186*** (0.059)	0.185*** (0.059)	0.181*** (0.059)
Incumbent Partisan	-0.072*** (0.015)	-0.064*** (0.015)	-0.067*** (0.015)
ECAV event in district × Incumbent Partisan	-0.095* (0.055)	-0.102* (0.054)	-0.104* (0.054)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.149	0.157	0.158
Observations	31241	31241	31241
Clusters	5520	5520	5520

Notes: All regressions include district and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Table C.IX: Turnout Regression with Partisanship Interaction

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Turnout (mean=0.74, sd=0.44)		
Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
Incumbent Partisan	0.105*** (0.005)	0.080*** (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)
Incumbent Partisan × Fear of Campaign Violence	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Socio-Economic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political Controls	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.057	0.175	0.193
Observations	52659	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210	9210

Notes: All regressions include district and round fixed effects. Column 2 includes individual-level socio-economic controls and column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Figure C.IV: Predicted Effects of Turnout Regression with Partisanship Interaction






Table C.X: Characteristics of Those Fearing Campaign Violence

	(1) Fear of Campaign Violence 4-Point Scale	(2) Binary
Age	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Age2	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Male	-0.087*** (0.008)	-0.037*** (0.004)
Rural	-0.002 (0.012)	0.004 (0.006)
Poverty Index	0.092*** (0.006)	0.040*** (0.003)
Education=1	0.021 (0.017)	0.010 (0.008)
Education=2	-0.026 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.009)
Education=3	0.016 (0.018)	0.002 (0.009)
Education=4	0.032 (0.020)	0.021** (0.010)
Education=5	-0.011 (0.023)	0.008 (0.011)
Education=6	-0.063** (0.028)	-0.024* (0.014)
Employment=2	0.016 (0.015)	0.016** (0.007)
Employment=3	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.006)
Incumbent Partisan	-0.106*** (0.012)	-0.056*** (0.006)
Non-Partisan	-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.029*** (0.006)
Community Membership	0.023*** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.003)
Community Meeting Attendance	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004** (0.002)
Interest in Public Affairs	0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.002)
Newspaper	0.022*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.002)
Radio	-0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)
TV	0.007* (0.004)	0.005*** (0.002)
Constant	0.956*** (0.041)	0.527*** (0.019)
R-Squared	0.079	0.085
Observations	52659	52659
Clusters	9210	9210

Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.