

INR 5507: International Organizations

Spring 2018

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Office Hours: Tuesdays 2:15-4:15pm and by appointment

Class Meeting: Tuesdays 11:45am-2:15pm (113 Bellamy)

Overview

International politics is increasingly institutionalized in all issue areas. Understanding the dynamics of international conflict and cooperation therefore requires that we understand the causes and consequences of institutionalization. In this course, we will focus on intergovernmental institutions and agreements and discuss the following questions about global governance: Why do states engage in international cooperation? Why do states establish international organizations? What explains variation in institutional design? What effects do international institutions have, and how do they influence state policy? What drives states' compliance with international agreements, and how important is compliance? What is the relationship between domestic politics and international cooperation? How do international organizations operate, and what effects do differences in membership, decision-making rules, and other design aspects have on outcomes?

This graduate survey course in international organizations will expose you to some of the classics as well as the state of the current debate. The course will begin with a theoretical overview of why and how countries cooperate, what organizations and institutions are, and how to study their demand, supply, design, and effects. The second section of the course will address particular issue areas of international cooperation/organization, including international trade, security, and human rights.

The course has two goals: (i) to introduce students to established debates and recent research on IOs and (ii) to encourage doctoral candidates to develop their own ideas for research and writing. To that end, the last week of class is set aside for presentation of research proposals by students. The assignments for the course are also designed to move you toward identifying researchable topics for study, and write and present a research paper.

Course Requirements

Grades will be assigned according to completion of the following course assignments:

Participation (20%): Preparation and participation are the lifeblood of a graduate seminar. All students should come to class having done **all** the readings and be prepared to discuss them in **depth** each week. To guide your reading and organize class discussion, I will post discussion questions on Canvas prior to those seven substantive classes without discussion lead teams. Discussion questions will be posted on Sundays at

noon. Before class, each student will select two of those questions for which they will then take responsibility for beginning the discussion. To earn a B for the week, students must demonstrate familiarity with the readings. To earn a B+/A-, students must demonstrate a sophisticated analysis of the strengths and weakness of individual studies in terms of their concepts, theories, research designs, and empirical analyses. To earn an A, students must apply such analysis across the various week's readings or connect these readings.

Discussion lead (20%): Five class discussions will be led by students. Each student will be part of a two-person team to lead class discussion twice during the semester. I strongly encourage the teams to plan carefully how they will motivate discussion, including the sequencing of questions and follow-up questions. Credit will be given for any innovation that evokes thoughtful discussion of how the week's readings are related to one another and to the rest of the course. Each leadership team will circulate discussion questions to the group by Sunday at noon before class. Not being part of the week's leadership team does not mean that you have the week off. Your participation will be graded as usual.

Research paper (40%): Students will be asked to write and submit a seminar paper (about 25 pages, due May 1) that is either:

- (a) A research proposal that identifies a theoretical or empirical puzzle worth exploring, situates it within the existing literature, articulates testable hypotheses, identifies appropriate methods and data for testing the argument, and discusses the proposal's potential strength and weaknesses.
- (b) A research paper that includes all the steps of a research proposal, but also conducts some preliminary data collection and analysis. The ultimate goal of these papers should be submission to an academic journal.

At various points during the semester, students will have opportunities to submit outlines, circulate their preliminary work, and discuss their proposals with me and their peers. A short paper (about 500 words) identifying the research topic and question is due February 27. Be sure to visit me during office hours early in the semester for guidance on picking a suitable topic. As the semester progresses continue to visit for guidance as you develop your theory and research design. In addition, there are two more opportunities for feedback:

Research paper draft (10%): A draft of the research paper (at least 8 pages) is due March 27 and will receive feedback from one student and me by April 3.

Research paper presentation (10%): In one of the last meetings of the course (April 17), each student will present their theory and research design from their final paper. Presentations should be 10-15 minutes and must include slides. You will be evaluated based on your presentational style, presentation of the problem, theory, hypotheses, results (if applicable) and clarity.

The final letter grade will be assigned according to the standard table:

93-100: A	89-87: B+	82-80: B-	76-73: C	69-67: D+	62-60: D-
92-90: A-	86-83: B	79-77: C+	72-70: C-	66-63: D	00-59: F

Policies

University Attendance Policy: Excused absences include documented illness, deaths in the family and other documented crises, call to active military duty or jury duty, religious holy days, and official University activities. These absences will be accommodated in a way that does not arbitrarily penalize students who have a valid excuse. Consideration will also be given to students whose dependent children experience serious illness.

Academic Honor Policy: The Florida State University Academic Honor Policy outlines the University's expectations for the integrity of students academic work, the procedures for resolving alleged violations of those expectations, and the rights and responsibilities of students and faculty members throughout the process. Students are responsible for reading the Academic Honor Policy and for living up to their pledge to ... be honest and truthful and ... [to] strive for personal and institutional integrity at Florida State University. See <http://fda.fsu.edu/Academics/Academic-Honor-Policy>)

Special Accommodations: Students with disabilities needing academic accommodation should: (1) register with and provide documentation to the Student Disability Resource Center; and (2) bring a letter to the instructor indicating the need for accommodation and what type. This should be done during the first week of class. This syllabus and other class materials are available in alternative format upon request. For more information about services available to FSU students with disabilities, contact the Student Disability Resource Center at 874 Traditions Way, 108 Student Services Building, 850-644-9566, sdrc@admin.fsu.edu, <http://www.disabilitycenter.fsu.edu/>

Syllabus Change Policy: Except for changes that substantially affect implementation of the evaluation (grading) statement, this syllabus is a guide for the course and is subject to change with advance notice.

Readings

Most readings except those in the Keohane book and the Hawkins et al. book should be easily accessible online. Let me know if you have any problems finding the assigned readings. You may find it useful to purchase the following two books:

- Robert Keohane. 1984/2005. *After Hegemony*. Princeton University Press.
- Darren Hawkins et al. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge University Press.

Schedule

January 9: Why International Institutions?

- John Mearsheimer. 1994/95. The False Promise of International Institutions. *IS* 19 (3): 5-49.
- Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin. 1995. The Promise of Institutional Theory. *IS* 20 (1): 39-51.
- Jon Pevehouse and Inken von Borzyskowski. 2016. International Organizations in World Politics. In *The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations*, edited by Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd, and Ian Johnstone, chapter 1.

January 16: Background and General Theory

- Robert Keohane. 1984/2005. *After Hegemony*, chapters 1 and 4-6 (pp. 5-17, 49-109).
- Oran Young. 1991. Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society. *IO* 45 (3): 281-308.
- Cheryl Shanks, Harold Jacobson, and Jeffrey Kaplan. 1996. Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992. *IO* 50 (4): 593-627.

January 23: Theoretical Developments

- Mancur Olson. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*, chapter 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade. *Economics and Politics* 2 (1): 1-23.

- Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane. 2005. Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. *APSR* 99 (1): 29-43.
- Leslie Johns. 2007. A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats. *IO* 61(1): 245-75.

January 30: Delegation

- Roland Vaubel. 2006. Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations. *RIO* 1 (2): 125-38.
- Darren Hawkins et al. 2006, chapters 1 and 5.
- Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *IO* 57 (2): 241-76.
- Tana Johnson and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Inter-governmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot. *IO* 68 (1): 177-209.
- Ranjit Lall. 2017. Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations. *IO* 71 (2): 245-280.

February 6: Institutional Design

- Michael Gilligan. 2004. Is there a Broader-Deeper Tradeoff in International Multilateral Agreements? *IO* 58 (3): 459-84.
- Barbara Koremenos. 2005. Contracting around International Uncertainty. *APSR* 99 (4): 549-65.
- Mark Copelovitch, and Tonya Putnam. 2014. Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation. *IO* 68 (2): 1-23.
- Jonas Tallberg et al. 2014. Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations. *IO* 68 (4): 741-74.
- David Bearce, Cody Eldredge, and Brandy Joliff. 2015. Do Finite Duration Provisions Reduce International Bargaining Delay? *IO* 69 (1): 219-39.
- Katerina Linos and Tom Pegram. 2016. The Language of Compromise in International Agreements. *IO* 70 (3): 587-621.

February 13: Credible Commitments

- Jon Pevehouse. 2002. With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy. *AJPS* 46(3): 611-626.
- Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen. 2013. Fit and Feasible: Why Democratizing States Form, not Join, International Organizations. *ISQ* 57(4): 831-841.
- Inken von Borzyskowski and Felicity Vabulas. 2018. Credible Commitments? Explaining IGO Suspensions to Sanction Political Backsliding. Conditionally accepted at *ISQ*.
- Lisa Martin. 2017. International Institutions: Weak Commitments and Costly Signals. *International Theory* 9 (3): 353-380.
- Beth Simmons and Allison Danner. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. *IO* 64 (2): 225-56.

February 20: Compliance

- Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. *IO* 47 (2): 175-205.
- George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? *IO* 50 (3): 379-406.
- Beth Simmons. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *APSR* 94 (4): 819-35.

- Jana Von Stein. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *APSR* 99 (4): 611-22.
- Lisa Martin. 2013. Against Compliance, in *Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art*, edited by Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack, 591-610. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wade Cole. 2015. Mind the Gap: State Capacity and the Implementation of Human Rights Treaties. *IO* 69 (2): 405-41.

February 27: International Trade Institutions | [Research topic due](#)

- Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94. *World Politics* 57 (4): 453-78.
- Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and WTO on World Trade. *IO* 61 (1): 37-67.
- Christina Davis and Meredith Wilf. 2016. Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO. *JOP* 79 (3).
- Peter Rosendorff. 2005. Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure. *APSR* 99 (3): 389-400.
- Marc Busch. 2007. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. *IO* 61 (4): 735-61.
- Leslie Johns and Krzysztof Pelc. 2014. Who Gets to Be in the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes. *IO* 68 (3): 663-99.

March 6: Alliances

- Virginia Page Fortna. 2003. Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. *IO* 57 (2): 337-72.
- Brett Ashley Leeds. 2003. Do Military Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. *AJPS* 47 (3): 427-39.
- Gheciu, Alexandra. 2005. Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the New Europe. *IO* 59 (4): 973-1012.
- Brian Rathbun. 2011. Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations. *IO* 65 (2): 243-73.
- Michaela Mattes. 2012. Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design. *IO* 66 (4): 679-707.
- Daina Chiba, Jesse Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2015. Careful Commitments: Democratic States and Alliance Design. *JOP* 77 (4): 968-982.

March 13: No Class (Spring Break)

March 20: The United Nations Security Council

- Erik Voeten. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. *APSR* 95 (4): 845-59.
- Erik Voeten. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Councils Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. *IO* 59 (3): 527-557.
- Alexander Thompson. 2006. Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *IO* 60 (1): 1-34.
- Songying Fang. 2008. The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics. *AJPS* 52 (2): 304-21.
- Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Vreeland. 2009. Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions? *Journal of*

Development Economics 88: 1-18.

March 27: Intra-State Conflict | [Research paper draft due](#)

- Nicholas Sambanis and Michael Doyle. 2000. International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. *APSR* 94 (4): 779-801.
- Virginia Page Fortna. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil Wars*, chapters 4 and 5.
- Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2014. Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting. *APSR* 108 (4): 737-53.
- Andrea Ruggeri, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis. 2016. Winning the Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict. *IO* 71 (1): 163-185.
- Johannes Karreth and Jaroslav Tir. 2013. International Institutions and Civil War Prevention. *JOP* 75 (1): 96-109.

April 3: Democratization and Human Rights | [Research paper peer review due](#)

- Judith Kelley. 2004. International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions. *IO* 58 (3): 425-57.
- Susan Hyde. 2011. Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion. *AJPS* 55 (2): 356-369.
- Allison Carnegie and Nikolay Marinov. 2017. Foreign Aid, Human Rights, and Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. *AJPS* 61 (3): 671-683.
- James Vreeland. 2008. Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *IO* 62 (1): 65-101.
- Yonatan Lupu. 2013. Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements. *IO* 67 (3): 469-503.

April 10: The International Criminal Court

- Judith Kelley. 2007. Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements. *APSR* 101 (3): 573-89.
- Terrence Chapman and Stephen Chaudoin. 2013. Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court. *ISQ* 57 (2): 400-09.
- Michael Gilligan. 2006. Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime. *IO* 60 (4): 935-67.
- Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons. 2016. Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? *IO* 70 (3): 443-475. And Corrigendum.
- Alyssa Prorok. 2017. The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and Civil Conflict Termination. *IO* 71 (2): 213-243.

April 17: [Research paper presentations](#)

April 24: Experiments in IO (TBD)

May 1: [Research paper due](#)