my book’s contributions and includes several interesting and important questions for future research. In this response, I address two questions Marinov raises about other interventions and state actors, and I offer two promising avenues for future work on aid effectiveness and subnational approaches.

First, why focus on observation and technical assistance? These are the two primary types of international election support (Thomas Carothers, “Elections and Democracy Support,” GSDRC 2015, 20–21), with about 60% of elections in Africa and Latin America observed and about 30% percent receiving technical assistance. I agree that many other policy interventions also take place around election times, potentially influencing election credibility and violence. In other work, I have examined seven of these interventions, including police training and youth programs (Jonas Claes and Inken von Borzyskowski, “What Works in Preventing Election Violence: Evidence from Liberia and Kenya,” 2018). Additionally, Birch and Muchlinski examine capacity building and attitude-changing programs, while Pokharel provides insights on diplomacy (Sarah Birch and David Muchlinski, “Electoral Violence Prevention: What Works?" Democratization 25, 2017; Bhojraj Pokharel, Preventing Election Violence through Diplomacy, 2019). As Marinov suggests, examining other types of election intervention, such as whether or how (threats of) sanctions or pro-autocracy aid influence election violence, is an interesting avenue for future research.

Second, what about state actors? How does the provision of foreign aid by states influence election violence, and when do states accept the help they are given? Marinov rightly points out that states also provide election aid directly; exploring the extent, forms, and effects of such direct state aid on election violence would be a great complement to my book and a valuable addition to this research field. We should note, however, that many states channel election support through IOs. For example, the United States channels much of it through NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Similarly, US embassies in host countries support programming implemented through international and local NGOs. Although states fund some democracy- and elections-supporting programs directly, they also usually make budget contributions to IOs such as the UN, EU, OSCE, OAS, and AU, which then facilitate such programs on the ground. On the receiving end, I have examined the demand and supply of election assistance in a previous article (Inken von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance: Who Seeks and Receives Technical Election Assistance?” Review of International Organizations 11, 2016). The book builds on these earlier insights to better account for selection dynamics underlying aid provision (pp. 67–68, 79–87).

Additionally, Marinov raises an important question for future work with regard to whether aid effects have institutional staying power. Ideally, technical assistance will render itself obsolete, but only if this support builds institutional capacity, rather than simply filling short-term gaps. Assessing the cumulative or long-term effectiveness of election aid over several electoral cycles is a promising avenue for future work.

Finally, I support Marinov’s call for more subnational research. My fieldwork in Liberia and Kenya has shaped my thinking about external election support and local efforts in election management to mitigate violence. Subnational work can advance our understanding of election management, the geography of election violence, how it sometimes intersects with other forms of political violence, how often it may be spontaneous rather than strategic, and the many other open questions in this growing research field (Sarah Birch, Ursula Daxecker, and Kristine Höglund, “Election Violence: An Introduction,” Journal of Peace Research 57, 2020).


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Rules and Allies: Foreign Election Interventions could not be timelier. Policy debates on foreign actions in national elections continue, from current congressional investigations about the US president’s request for foreign interference in the 2020 election to Russian meddling in elections in the United States in 2016 and in Madagascar in 2019. Such examples raise pertinent questions about how, when, and which governments choose to influence other countries’ elections and what effects that interference has. In their new book, Johannes Bubeck and Nikolay Marinov shed light on these important questions. Using formal models, case studies, and quantitative analyses of an impressive new dataset, they provide valuable insights for scholars and practitioners alike. The book is organized into seven chapters—literature review and theory (chaps. 2–3), data coding and patterns (chaps. 4–5), interventions by the United States (chap. 6), and extensions of the formal model to consider budgets, coups, and buying allies (chaps. 7–8)— plus an introduction and conclusion.

Bubeck and Marinov define foreign election interventions as preelection “deliberate attempt[s] by a foreign government to change the electoral rules or the election outcome” (p. 45). Conceptually, they distinguish between two types of election interventions: process and candidate. Process interventions are intended to influence how the election is run. Such international election support
includes election observation (Susan Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm*, 2011), technical capacity assistance (Inken von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance: Who Seeks and Receives Technical Election Assistance?” *Review of International Organizations* 11 [2], 2016), and other efforts to level the playing field and support a fair vote—or anti-process actions such as international support for gerrymandering, election violence, and (post-vote) international endorsements of clearly fraudulent processes (p. 80). In contrast to process interventions, candidate interventions are intended to influence who runs or is supported. Such partisan interventions are in favor of a particular candidate/party and can take the form of mobilization (support for a campaign or aid promises conditional on a certain candidate’s victory) or intimidation (threats of sanction or military invasion; pp. 89–90).

Partisan interventions have been documented for great powers (Dov Levin, “When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results,” *International Studies Quarterly* 60 [2], 2016). *Rules and Allies* broadens the range of potential interveners and provides explanations for when one type of intervention is used over the other, when they are used in combination, and what effects we should expect them to have. In doing so, the book connects to a wealth of research on democracy assistance (Jon Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*, 2005; Daniela Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms: International Actors and the Politics of Electoral Misconduct*, 2013), buying allies (James Vreeland and Axel Dreher, *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence*, 2014), and foreign-imposed regime change (Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,” *International Security* 37 [4], 2013).

Bubeck and Marinov argue—and show empirically—that foreign powers are more likely to pick sides in an election as the policy positions of competing parties in the target country diverge (“polarization”) on a dimension of interest to the foreign power. Given divergence, a foreign power has incentives to support the candidate/party more aligned with it. For example, an outside power favoring the government candidate has incentives for partisan intervention on behalf of the government candidate. An outside power favoring the opposition has incentives to support the opposition candidate (allies) or the election process (rules), because improved election quality means less bias (incumbency advantage) and a more level playing field, which also help the opposition’s chances of winning. Outside powers often combine candidate and process interventions for higher impact. In addition to party polarization, other factors driving a potential intervener’s decision to meddle in foreign elections include the outsider’s preference for liberalism/democracy promotion, the target country’s geopolitical importance, historical ties between target and sender, and whether other interveners are likely to act (hegemony or war context). Finally, the authors argue that election interventions are consequential: they can change both election outcomes (who wins) and processes (election quality).

The empirical tests of these predictions are powered by a rich new dataset that provides information on potential interveners, the type and nature of election interference (pro/anti-process, pro/anti-candidate), and a measure of party polarization in the target country. Bubeck and Marinov manage the data-gathering effort with a clever research strategy: from all elections worldwide from 1945 to 2012 that were minimally competitive (based on Nelda data), they take a stratified random sample so that each country can be included once during and after the Cold War. This results in a sample of 262 national elections in 157 countries (about 10% of all elections). This strategy makes data collection feasible and the results generalizable. For each election, the authors identify potential interveners: global and regional powers, neighbors, former colonizers, those with oil interests, military bases, and ethnic diasporas, as well as international organizations. The coding decisions are meticulously documented in an expansive online appendix that links the relevant quotes from news sources to variable coding to maximize transparency and replicability. The authors set a new standard for documenting datasets of this kind.

*Rules and Allies* also provides many novel empirical insights. For example, foreign election intervention is widespread: of the 262 sampled elections, two-thirds had some form of election intervention: 52% had process interventions, 33% had candidate interventions, and 20% had both. Moreover, the United States is the most frequent intervener in both process and candidate interventions: “American presence is larger than the footprint of others by a large factor” (p. 119–20). Other common interveners regarding candidates are China, France, and the EU (p. 119); regarding process they are international organizations (the African Union and the EU), the United Kingdom, and France. Although the United States’ role in process interventions especially after 1990 may reflect increased commitment to liberalism and democracy promotion, its leading role in candidate interventions is noteworthy, because Western media usually note meddling by Russia.

The book makes several groundbreaking contributions and provides promising avenues for future research. One aspect that is worth noting is the measurement of process intervention, which seems to include a judgment on its effectiveness (p. 79). This implies that the coding is (at least partially) focused on outcomes, rather than presence or intent. In contrast, candidate interventions
are coded based on intent (p. 89), and they capture whether the intervention happened or was designed to influence the outcome, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness. However, the outcome-focused coding of process intervention could impair our ability to examine whether such interventions matter, because effectiveness appears on both sides of the equation. It could also mean that a coding of 0 conflates two situations: that no process intervention happened or that the process intervention had no effect. That said, most example cases of process intervention mentioned in the book seem to be coded based on intent, so perhaps this is simply a discrepancy in the coding description that the authors may wish to clarify for future users.

A promising avenue for future work is assessing the effectiveness of election interventions. The book’s empirical tests are focused on establishing bivariate correlations between the key variables of interest. This is a necessary and important first cut; perhaps it is all that can be achieved in an already very ambitious book that presents a formal model to generate new theory, introduces a new dataset, and conducts empirical tests on drivers, effects, and extensions. Future work should expand on these tests by adding control variables to account for context and alternative explanations to deepen our knowledge of the drivers and consequences of interventions. For example, whereas the argument that polarization drives intervention is intuitive and persuasive, candidate popularity probably also plays a role. Even if polarization is high, actual intervention likely also depends on whether that ally is likely to win anyway, faces a tight election, or is unlikely to emerge victorious regardless of foreign intervention. Outsiders may also support the winning horse to secure economic profits in the target country, regardless of polarization (Michael Schwitz and Gaelle Borgia, “How Russia Meddles Abroad for Profit: Cash, Trolls and a Cult Leader,” New York Times, November 11, 2019). For intervention consequences, future research could further examine effectiveness. Accounting for context and selection, does intervention “work” in achieving its intended goals, and under which conditions is that more likely? Which types and subtypes of intervention are more effective? When do election wars lead to intra- or interstate violence?

By providing the necessary data and a theory of intervention, Bubeck and Marinov have put researchers in an excellent position to pursue these and many other interesting questions of great policy relevance. The central theoretical contributions of this impressive book—drawing attention to partisan meddling, the trade-offs between partisan and process interventions, and election wars—may well become more important in the years to come, with disinformation campaigns being waged by both existing and rising powers. Rules and Allies is thus also highly recommended for scholars and practitioners interested in foreign affairs, diplomacy, security studies, and political communication.

Response to Inken von Borzyskowski’s Review of Rules and Allies: Foreign Election Interventions

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— Nikolay Marinov

We thank Inken von Borzyskowski for positioning our book in the literature in an incisive and meticulous way: this is a great service to its potential audience. We also appreciate the broadening of the conversation to regime change and vote buying at the UN, among other topics. This helps us see potential synergies and cross-pollinations. One interesting idea, arising from the present exchange, for example, would be to combine the study of post-election violence, the forte of Borzyskowski’s book, with information drawn from our book on the partisan activities of foreign powers, to see whether and how partisan activities influence violence on the ground and whether international organizations play a moderating role.

We would like to add some context to Borzyskowski’s review of prior scholarship on partisan interventions. This scholarship started with two works using public opinion data, derived from two country cases riven by partisan divisions and beset by all-too-interested outsiders: Ukraine and Lebanon (Stephen Shulman and Stephen Bloom, “The Legitimacy of Foreign Intervention in Elections: The Ukrainian Response,” Review of International Studies 38, 2012; Daniel Corstange and Nikolay Marinov, “Taking Sides in Other People’s Elections: The Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention,” American Journal of Political Science 55, 2012). These works probed voter responses in each of the two states experiencing interventions. Dov Levin’s work on partisan interventions (cited by Borzyskowski) added for the first time the element of large-N data analysis, offering regression results on the effects of great power support on the electoral fortunes of candidates. With the infamous Russian intervention in the US elections, the question of voter responses to interventions is back in the limelight: Michael Tomz and Jessica Weeks show that Americans, like the Lebanese and Ukrainians, are divided along party lines on what to think about foreign meddling (“Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral Intervention,” forthcoming in the American Political Science Review). Thus, the future conversation is likely to oscillate between its inception in public opinion case-study data (often featuring survey experiments) and observational analyses of large-N cross-country outcomes such as margin of victory.

We thank Inken von Borzyskowski for a very careful reading and accurate restatement of our argument. We are
also grateful for the painstaking consideration of our coding rules. The review alerted us to an important miscommunication. On p. 79, we write that the process variable “identifies whether the intervention of foreign powers enhanced, weakened, or had no observable effect on the electoral process.” We now see that this does not read as we meant it to. It should state that the process variable “identifies whether the intervention of foreign powers sought to enhance or weaken the democratic rules of the game.” The reviewer is correct that conflating outcomes with intentions is problematic. We trust that other readers (like the reviewer) will glean from our case studies that we sought to capture the foreign intent to change the rules, rather than its effects. Indeed, our goal was to provide a novel dataset of intent to make a difference (via some identifiable action), which would then help us and others further study whether interventions, in fact, had the intended effects.

Borzyskowski also points out that our large-N analysis is somewhat skeletal and does not have potentially relevant information on how candidates are polling and other covariates. We agree that such information would be highly desirable. Part of the difficulty is obtaining and adding good data on such background variables in our representative—but relatively limited in size—sample. Perhaps the time has come for the community of scholars studying elections to team up and collect systematic information on international activities surrounding elections. This would broaden our sample and add exciting new variables. It might also help us begin the study of novel forms of interventions such as spreading propaganda, including via social media, as suggested by the reviewer. We dare to hope that such collaborations by a number of the scholars cited in or part of this exchange will come about to push forward the exciting field that books like the one by von Borzyskowski are helping create.