

INR 5934: Third Parties in Intra-State Conflicts

Spring 2017

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Office Hours: Mondays 2:15-4:15pm and by appointment

Class Meeting: Mondays 11:45am-2:15pm in 113 Bellamy

Overview

Since the end of World War II, the vast majority of conflicts have been within countries rather than between them. This course surveys competing theories about the causes and conclusion of the dominant brand of conflict in the world today and examines how the international community deals with these conflicts. What (if anything) can outsiders do to facilitate the termination of civil wars and prevent their recurrence? Why do third parties sometimes get involved and sometimes choose not to? Under which conditions can third parties succeed in efforts to end war? And why do some third parties use the carrot-and-stick approach in negotiating settlements, while others focus more on helping disputed sides communicate effectively? This course will familiarize students with key debates about coercive and non-coercive international interventions in armed conflicts and conflict-prone environments. While we cover some classic works, the course focuses on recent studies. We will discuss why states and/or rebel groups fight in the first place; methodological challenges in learning about conflict and intervention; and a series of different types of interventions, the conditions in which they are likely, their intended and unintended effects, and the benchmarks we should use to evaluate them. In terms of intervention types, topics include mediation, military and economic coercion, peacekeeping, and aid.

The course has two goals: (i) to introduce students to established debates and recent research on international intervention and (ii) to encourage doctoral candidates to develop their own ideas for research and writing. For that purpose, one class meeting at the end of the semester is set aside for presentation of research proposals by students. The assignments for the course are also designed to move you toward identifying researchable topics for study, and write and present a research paper.

Course Requirements

Grades will be assigned according to completion of the following course assignments:

Participation (20%): Preparation and participation are the lifeblood of a graduate seminar. All students should come to class having done **all** the readings and be prepared to discuss them in depth each week. To guide your reading and organize class discussion, I will post discussion questions on Blackboard prior

to those seven substantive classes without discussion lead teams. Each student will be asked to select two of those questions for which they will then take responsibility for beginning the discussion. To earn a B for the week, students must demonstrate familiarity with the readings. To earn a B+/A-, students must demonstrate a sophisticated analysis of the strengths and weakness of individual studies in terms of their concepts, theories, research designs, and empirical analyses. To earn an A, students must apply such analysis across the various week's readings or connect these readings.

Discussion lead (20%): Six class discussions will be lead by students. Each student will be part of a 2-person team to lead class discussion twice during the semester. I strongly encourage the teams to plan carefully how they will motivate discussion. Credit will be given for any innovation that evokes thoughtful discussion of how the week's readings are related to one another and to the rest of the course. Each leadership team will circulate discussion questions to the group by noon the day before class. Not being part of the week's leadership team does not mean that you have the week off. Your participation will be graded as usual.

Research paper (40%): Students will be asked to write and submit a seminar paper (about 25 pages, due May 1) that is either:

- (a) A research proposal that identifies a theoretical or empirical puzzle worth exploring, situates it within the existing literature, articulates testable hypotheses, identifies appropriate methods and data for testing the argument, and discusses the proposal's potential strength and weaknesses.
- (b) A research paper that includes all the steps of a research proposal, but also conducts some preliminary data collection and analysis. The ultimate goal of these papers should be submission to an academic journal.

At various points during the semester, students will have opportunities to submit outlines, circulate their preliminary work, and discuss their proposals with me and their peers. A short paper (about 500 words) identifying the research topic and question is due February 27. Be sure to visit me during office hours early in the semester for guidance on picking a suitable question. As the semester progresses, continue to visit for guidance as you develop your theory and research design. In addition, there are two more opportunities for feedback:

Research paper draft (10%): A draft of the research paper (at least 8 pages) is due April 3 and will receive feedback from one student and me by April 10.

Research paper presentation (10%): Towards the end of the course (April 17), each student will present their theory and research design from their final paper. Presentations should be 10-15 minutes and must include slides. You will be evaluated based on your presentational style, presentation of the problem, theory, hypotheses, results (if applicable) and clarity. Research papers are due May 1.

The final letter grade will be assigned according to the standard table:

93-100: A	89-87: B+	82-80: B-	76-73: C	69-67: D+	62-60: D-
92-90: A-	86-83: B	79-77: C+	72-70: C-	66-63: D	00-59: F

Policies

University Attendance Policy: Excused absences include documented illness, deaths in the family and other documented crises, call to active jury or military duty, religious holy days, and official University activities. These absences will be accommodated in a way that does not arbitrarily penalize students who have a valid excuse. Consideration will also be given to students whose dependent children experience serious illness.

Academic Honor Policy: The Florida State University Academic Honor Policy outlines the University's expectations for the integrity of student's academic work, the procedures for resolving alleged violations of those expectations, and the rights and responsibilities of students and faculty members throughout the process. Students are responsible for reading the Academic Honor Policy and for living up to their pledge to ... be honest and truthful and ... [to] strive for personal and institutional integrity at Florida State University. See <http://fda.fsu.edu/Academics/Academic-Honor-Policy>

Special Accommodations: Students with disabilities needing academic accommodation should: (1) register with and provide documentation to the Student Disability Resource Center; and (2) bring a letter to the instructor indicating the need for accommodation and what type. This should be done during the first week of class. This syllabus and other class materials are available in alternative format upon request. For more information about services available to FSU students with disabilities, contact the Student Disability Resource Center at 874 Traditions Way, 108 Student Services Building, 850-644-9566, sdrc@admin.fsu.edu, <http://www.disabilitycenter.fsu.edu/>

Syllabus Change Policy: Except for changes that substantially affect implementation of the evaluation (grading) statement, this syllabus is a guide for the course and is subject to change with advance notice.

Schedule

January 9: Intra-State Conflict and Third Parties

- Nicholas Sambanis. 2004. What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition. *JCR* 48(6): 814-858.
- Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, and Kyle Joyce. 2008. Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process. *JPR* 45(3): 345-363.
- Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen. 2005. Making and Keeping Peace. *IO* 59(2): 261-92.

January 16: No class (MLK day)

January 23: Causes and Conclusion of Intra-State Conflict

- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4):563-595.
- James Fearon and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *APSR* 97(1): 75-90.
- Michael Findley. 2013. Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution. *JCR* 57(5): 905-932.
- Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. 2001. Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables. *IO* 55(1): 183-208.
- Macartan Humphreys. 2005. Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms. *JCR* 49(4): 508-537.
- Barbara Walter. 1997. The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. *IO* 51(3): 335-64.

January 30: Research Design Issues

- Michael Findley and Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach. *JOP* 68(4): 828-837.
- Michael Gilligan and Stephen Stedman. 2003. Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? *International Studies Review* 5(4): 37-54.

- Michael Greig. 2001. Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation Between Enduring Rivals. *JCR* 45(6): 691-718.
- Marieke Kleiboer. 1996. Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation. *JCR* 40(2): 360-389.
- Patrick Regan. 1996. Conditions of Successful Third Party Intervention in Intra-state Conflicts. *JCR* 40(1): 336-359.
- Patrick Regan. 1998. Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice. *JOP* 60(3): 754-79.

February 6: Military Intervention

- Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew Enterline. 2000. Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820-1992. *ISQ* 44(4): 615-642.
- Stephen Gent. 2007. Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Intervention. *JOP* 69(4): 1089-1102.
- Jun Koga. 2011. Where Do Third Parties Intervene? Third Parties Domestic Institutions and Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts. *ISQ* 55(4): 1143-1166.
- Patrick Regan. 2002. Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict. *JCR* 46(1): 55-73.
- Reed Wood, Jacob Kathman, and Stephen Gent. 2012. Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate Conflicts. *JPR* 49(5): 647-660.

February 13: Peacekeeping

- Kyle Beardsley, David Cunningham, and Peter White. Forthcoming. Resolving Civil Wars before they Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention. *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Page Fortna. 2004. Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War. *ISQ* 48 (2): 269-92.
- Michael Gilligan and Ernest Sergenti. 2008. Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 89-122.
- Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2013. United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War. *AJPS* 57(4): 875-91.
- Mark Mullenbach. 2005. Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions. *ISQ* 49(3): 529-556.

February 20: Peacebuilding

- Severine Autesserre. 2009. Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention. *IO* 63: 249-80.
- Charles Call. 2008. Knowing peace when you see it: Setting standards for peacebuilding success. *Civil Wars* 10(2): 173-194.
- Michael Greig and Paul Diehl. 2005. The peacekeeping-peacemaking dilemma. *ISQ* 49(4): 621-646.
- Nicholas Sambanis and Michael Doyle. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, chapters 2, 3, and 5. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

February 27: Sanctions | [Research topic due](#)

- Abel Escriba-Folch. 2010. Economic sanctions and the duration of civil conflicts. *JPR* 47(2): 129-141.
- Lisa Hultman and Dursun Peksen. Forthcoming. Successful or Counterproductive Coercion? The Effect of International Sanctions on Conflict Intensity. *JCR*.

- David Lektzian and Patrick Regan. 2016. Economic Sanctions, Military Interventions, and Civil Conflict Outcomes. *JPR* 53(4): 554-568.
- Nikolay Marinov. 2005. Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders? *AJPS* 49(3): 564-576.
- Reed Wood. 2008. A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001. *ISQ* 52(3): 489-513.

March 6: Mediation

- Scott Gartner. 2011. Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability. *JOP* 73(2): 380-90.
- Michael Greig and Patrick Regan. 2008. When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars. *ISQ* 52(4): 759-781.
- Lindsay Reid. 2017. Finding a Peace That Lasts: Mediator Leverage and the Durable Resolution of Civil Wars. *JCR*.
- Isak Svensson. 2007. Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace. *JPR* 44(2): 177-194.
- Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Gartner. 2006. Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation. *International Interactions* 32(4): 329-354.

March 13: No class (Spring break)

March 20: Foreign Aid

- James Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-conflict Liberia. *American Economic Review* 99(2): 287-291.
- Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, Molly Bauer. 2010. Economic Liberalization via IMF Structural Adjustment: Sowing the Seeds of Civil War? *IO* 64(3): 339-356.
- Neil Narang. 2014. Humanitarian Assistance and the Duration of Peace after Civil War. *JOP* 76(2): 446-460.
- Richard Nielsen, Michael Findley, Zachary Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel Nielson. 2011. Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict. *AJPS* 55(2): 219-232.
- Burcu Savun and Daniel Tirone. 2011. Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict? *AJPS* 55(2): 233-246.

March 27: Election Assistance

- Inken von Borzyskowski. 2016. Resisting Democracy Assistance: Who Seeks and Receives Technical Election Assistance? *Review of International Organizations* 11(2): 247-282.
- Svitlana Chernykh. 2014. When Do Political Parties Protest Election Results? *Comparative Political Studies* 47(10): 1359-1383.
- Svitlana Chernykh and Milan Svoblik. 2015. Third-Party Actors and the Success of Democracy: How Electoral Commissions, Courts, and Observers Shape Incentives for Electoral Manipulation and Post-Election Protests. *JOP* 77(2): 407-420.
- Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie. 2015. The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post-civil War Democracy. *World Politics* 67(1): 37-71.
- Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov. 2014. Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation. *IO* 68: 1-31.

April 3: International Law | [Research paper draft due](#)

- Stephen Chaudoin. 2016. How Contestation Moderates the Effects of International Institutions: The International Criminal Court and Kenya. *JOP* 78(2): 557-571.
- Emilie Hafner-Burton. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression. *IO* 59(3): 593-629.
- Oona Hathaway. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? *Yale Law Journal* 111: 1935-2041.
- Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons. 2016. Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? *IO* 70: 443-475.
- Eric Neumayer. 2005. Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights? *JCR* 49(6): 925-53.

April 10: NGOs and private actors | [Research paper peer review due](#)

- Emilie Hafner-Burton. 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *IO* 62: 689-716.
- Holger Kern and Jens Hainmueller. 2009. Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes. *Political Analysis* 17(4): 377-399.
- Amanda Murdie and Dursun Peksen. 2014. The Impact of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian Intervention. *JOP* 76(1): 215-228.
- Jan Pierskalla and Florian Hollenbach. 2013. Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa. *APSR* 107(2): 207-224.
- Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2006. Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. *IO* 60(2): 335-366.

April 17: [Research paper presentations](#)

April 24: Spoilers

- David Cunningham. 2006. Veto Players and Civil War Duration. *AJPS* 50(4): 875-892.
- David Cunningham. 2010. Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars. *JPR* 47(2): 115-127.
- Desiree Nilsson. 2008. Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements. *JPR* 45(4): 479-496.
- Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David Cunningham. 2011. Explaining external support for insurgent groups. *IO* 65(4): 709-744.
- Stephen Stedman. 1997. Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. *IS* 22(2): 5-53.

May 1: [Research papers due](#)