The first international organization in the post-Napoleonic era was formed after the Congress of Vienna in 1816—the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine. Since 1816, the number of international organizations in world politics has greatly expanded. As of 2013, the Union of International Associations cataloged 1,172 international organizations (IOs) functioning around the globe.¹ These organizations work in nearly every substantive area of international politics: trade, security, finance, environment, development, human rights, science, and culture. Clearly, international organizations pervade international life.

Perhaps because of this pervasiveness, the field of international relations has developed a myriad of approaches to studying IOs. Theories and empirical studies have used numerous theoretical traditions in an attempt to understand IOs, including realist, liberal, Marxist, and constructivist approaches. Empirical studies range from single-IO studies to large-N quantitative investigations. Despite significant

¹ This includes organizations that are emanations, i.e. not independent from another “parent” organization.
research on IOs, however, there are still many unresolved questions regarding their formation, operation, and efficacy.

The purpose of this chapter is to give a broad overview of international organizations in world politics, highlighting some important research areas, while suggesting future avenues for progress. We take a somewhat narrow view in defining the category of “international organizations.” We define IOs as formal organizations, with a permanent secretariat, and three or more member states. Somewhat minimized in our review is the broader concept of international regimes. While this omission is not meant as a judgment on the value of the study of regimes, the choice to minimize their discussion is to allow a focus on more formalized organizations. However, because a significant period of theorization on IOs was dominated by regime theory, a discussion of regimes is inevitable here.\(^2\)

The approach of the chapter is to follow the logical progression of the life cycle of a state's interaction with an IO: what explains the decision to form IOs; what form do the IOs take once a decision is made to create one; which issues are taken to IOs/which IOs are joined if they already exist; how do they operate; and do they achieve their stated goals. Although the chapter is not able to cover every strand of work on IOs, this life-cycle approach to IOs helps elucidate many of the puzzles concerning IOs, while allowing us to suggest how the answers to the puzzles potentially interact with one another.\(^3\)

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**The Demand for IOs: What Drives IO Formation?**

The study of what drives IO creation became systematic and routinized in the post-World War II era. The attempt to generalize from the creation of the United Nations

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\(^2\) This definition also precludes an extensive discussion of the English school of international relations—that an international society can emerge where states are bound by a set of mutually constituted set of rules. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

the demand for IOs: what drives IO formation?

UN), its attendant organizations, and more importantly, the European Coal and Steel Community, moved forward with the adaptation of functionalist ideas. IOs were argued to serve a functional purpose: minimize nationalism and attachment to territory, which had for centuries served as the basis for political conflict. The functionalist project could be a top-down process (as it was for Mitrany) or a bottom-up process, where IOs formed to facilitate citizen interaction on a large scale (as conceived of by Karl Deutsch and his associates). Functionalism, which had developed as an anti-statist project in the interwar period, incorporated the behavior of sovereign governments. Rather than replacing territorially based states, the process of integration through organizations would take place with states designing cooperation in technical areas.

Neofunctionalism arose after World War II and dominated the 1960s and early 1970s discussion of the creation of IOs. It built on early functionalist ideas and added the concept of spillover of cooperation from one realm to another: organizations grew from efforts to overcome political conflicts through the integration of technical tasks. One need to look no further than the post-War development of the UN specialized agencies to see functionalism at work—issues of broad importance were addressed through the creation of institutions which began as technically oriented on issues ranging from nuclear energy (the International Atomic Energy Agency), to health (the World Health Organization), and development (the UN Commission on Trade and Development). Several regions attempted to replicate the European experience, and research on IOs focused heavily on those efforts—and later on their attendant failures.

It was these failures of regional integration and European difficulties in deepening integration, however, that gave rise to a new generation of studies of how

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and why IOs formed. It brought back a strong realist-oriented take on IOs that sought to explain why so many IOs had failed to achieve their aims. One key strand of this literature was developed around the concept of hegemony. Borrowed from economic historian Charles Kindleberger, some realist-oriented scholars of IOs took Kindleberger’s conclusion concerning the Great Depression (a lack of global leadership led to a decline in international cooperation) and applied it to international regimes: strong states were needed to create international cooperation. In the absence of those strong states, international cooperation and the organizations that guided that cooperation would inevitably decline.

Later iterations of what was labeled Hegemony Stability Theory (HST) held that the hegemon created regimes and organizations (such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) to facilitate leadership. In this model, hegemons created the supply of IOs which smaller states would subscribe to, and in this way hegemons could make their rule more efficient, thus saving resources to forestall their inevitable decline. A more critical (Marxist) version of the same idea is proffered by Robert Cox, who argues that the IOs created by the victors of the social conflicts of the nineteenth century (including, but not limited to, the international financial institutions) abet strong states’ rule over other states in the international system. These views differ sharply from that of Ikenberry, who claims that strong states create international institutions to bind themselves, signaling “strategic restraint” to reduce fear in smaller states. The creation of IOs, in all of these accounts, is based on underlying power asymmetries in world politics, serving the interests of the powerful either in a benevolent or malevolent fashion.

Another strand of work that rose in response to the seeming failure of regional integration, gridlock at the UN, and halting progress of deepening European integration was regime theory. Regimes, for many theorists, were intervening variables between state preferences and outcomes. They were not designed by states to solve a particular problem at hand, but rather emerged as “rules, norms, principles, and decision-making
procedures” that would create or focus expectations about behavior. This was an explicit move away from formal organizations as the central topic of study.

While regime theory and HST grew to dominate discussions of IO formation, Robert Keohane’s *After Hegemony* introduced an entirely new take on the foundation and function of IOs. Keohane simultaneously sought to criticize HST and theorize explicitly about the demand for IOs. First, Keohane argued that HST only explained the supply of IOs and regimes, and even then, did so inadequately when one examined varying issue areas. Moreover, HST could not explain why regimes were more abundant (and growing) at a time when the global hegemon was waning.

Second, Keohane moved to bring back the demand side perspective from functionalist days. Drawing on theories of transaction cost economics and neofunctionalism, Keohane argued that states create institutions because they have common interests in cooperation to achieve mutual gains. Yet, because states are rational egoists, they cannot achieve these gains without institutions to guide cooperation. Thus, there is a demand for regimes that allows states to achieve gains that they otherwise could not. In *After Hegemony*, for example, Keohane argues that the foundation of the International Energy Agency reduced transaction costs and information asymmetries after the 1973 oil crisis to facilitate cooperation on energy issues.

Interestingly, what all theorists had in common in their moves to regime theory, HST, and (what others would label for Keohane) neoliberal institutionalism was the use of the systemic level of analysis. Gone were differentiated states (except in the crudest of classifications) and domestic politics. This was a pronounced break from the prior generation of scholarship, which examined citizen demand or domestic political debates about national interests.

In the 1990s and 2000s, an explicit move to reconsider domestic politics in the creation of IOs emerged. Building on the two-level games work of Putnam, scholars began to examine how domestic preferences could drive states to form IOs for domestic reasons rather than primarily for internationally driven reasons. In this vein, Moravcsik argues that international organizations can help certain types of states solve domestic credible commitment problems. Specifically, joining IOs can be driven by the need for states to credibly commit to particular policies domestically. Forming international agreements allows states to benefit from external

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monitoring, delegating compliance verification to third-party actors. Similarly, Pevehouse examined how domestic actors can use IOs to lock-in democratic reforms, while Mansfield and Pevehouse suggest that the rise in IO memberships occurs in the wake of transitions to democracy. In both cases, IOs serve to help leaders commit to policies favored by particular domestic coalitions of actors.

In essence, these papers all suggest opening up the concept of “the demand for IOs,” and focus on not only the international demand for IOs, but also the domestic demand. Notably, much of the literature on domestic politics and IOs shies away from questions of organization formation, assuming that IOs exist which can meet the requirements of domestic actors. We return to the discussion of domestic politics and IOs later in the chapter when we discuss which IOs states choose to join or conduct policy through.

Designing IOs: Once IOs Are the Solution—How Are They Built?

Once states decide to create an IO, design questions arise. Scholars have begun to focus on explaining variation in institutional features, such as membership size and heterogeneity, voting rules, issue linkage, time horizons, and monitoring and enforcement capacity—issues critical to an organization’s effectiveness and chances of survival.

Rational Design

Early efforts to explain variation in IO design focused primarily on variation in formalization as a result of the nature of the cooperation problem and the need for flexibility among states. Other scholars concentrated on the legal aspects of IO creation and institutionalization.

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In 2001, a group of scholars took a new approach to this issue. Building on the assumption that states are rational actors who use IOs to further their own goals, the rational design school argues that states design institutions intentionally. In other words, IOs are “negotiated responses to the problems which actors face.” By focusing on five design features (membership, issue scope, centralization, control, and flexibility), the rational design literature proposes that variation in institutional design can be explained by the nature of the problem (distribution or enforcement), actors (number and asymmetry), and the level of uncertainty faced by states (about others’ behavior and preferences, or the state of the world). A number of statistical and case studies have been conducted to test these conjectures, with mixed results.

While this research has enhanced our understanding of design outcomes, one important but underexplored area concerns the dynamics of the bargaining process, and especially the role that power and politics play when design is “in motion.” Other questions also remain unexplored. For example, one would expect states to wield less power in the design of emanations or “second-order IOs,” but this question has not been sufficiently addressed. In addition, we have little systematic knowledge about what drives variation in IO tasks/mandates, even though hypotheses have been suggested.

Delegation

While the rational design literature explored member state control over IOs as a feature, it did not delve into which functions member states delegate to IOs or how states control IOs once delegation has occurred. These aspects of rational design have spurred a separate strand of research. Taking inspiration from domestic and

32 Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.”
comparative political analysis, the delegation literature focuses on the principal–agent relationship, where member state governments (the collective principal) hire an IO (agent) to perform some function(s). Such delegation, in theory, reduces transaction costs and generates gains from specialization.

In the delegation literature, the characteristics and preferences of the principal as well as the dynamics of the principal–agent relationship determine the design of IOs. This research found, for example, that preference heterogeneity among principals and the need for reliable information produce fewer ex ante controls and thus greater IO autonomy. States have delegated functions to a host of IOs because of informational or distributional concerns. For example, in the case of informational demand, states have delegated authority for monitoring behavior in the realm of nuclear testing (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) and nuclear safety (International Atomic Energy Agency). For distributional concerns, states have endowed IOs with the authority for dispute resolution in trade matters (World Trade Organization: WTO) as well as territorial issues (International Court of Justice). Further, states have delegated authority due to high costs of non-coordination, for instance to the World Health Organization and the International Telecommunication Union.

Delegation scholarship has explored new ground by highlighting problems after the initial design stage, once powers have been transferred and IO autonomy has been established. Besides general agency losses, there is a trade-off between gains from specialization and agency slack in the form of shirking and slippage. This is especially true for international courts, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which were often intentionally endowed with more autonomy. Again,

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38 Hawkins et al., *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

preference heterogeneity within the collective principal can make post hoc control mechanisms—such as IO reform or recontracting—quite difficult.\textsuperscript{40}

**Constructivist Approaches**

Constructivist approaches criticize the functionalist and rationalist logics of design and delegation research and instead propose that IO design follows other logics not reducible to material or efficiency interests. For example, Wendt argues that instead of strictly maximizing payoffs (logic of consequences), states may also choose on the basis of what is normatively appropriate (logic of appropriateness).\textsuperscript{41} Specifically, Wendt argues that the rationalist design project ignores questions involving the knowledge of what values to pursue in design—this requires a deeper investigation of normative concerns in the design stage.\textsuperscript{42} To take one example, while functionalism cannot explain the timing of states’ adoption of science bureaucracies, Finnemore finds that this development was prompted by new UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) norms.\textsuperscript{43} The design of UNESCO policies was meant to maximize the spread of particular ideas because they were normatively valued.

Thus, constructivist approaches can also be seen as a deeper explanation of IO features, by exploring the preconditions for rational design. These prerequisites include how states come to identify issues as problems requiring collective action in the first place, the timing of IO design, and how some functional design options may be off the table because they are normatively unattractive. In the first category, Adler and Haas argue that “before choices involving cooperation can be made, circumstances must be assessed and interests identified.”\textsuperscript{44} In this sense, constructivist approaches ask questions about conditions prior to negotiating the design of IOs.

Within the constructivist approach, sociological institutionalism reverses the focus on state agency to explore the impact of institutions on state agents acting within them. These scholars argue that institutions can constitute and shape states’ preferences and identities.\textsuperscript{45} In the security realm, early work by Deutsch and associates

\begin{itemize}
  \item Nielson and Tierney, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform.”
  \item Ibid.
found that successful international integration was mainly achieved through a “sense of community” among the populace rather than functional integration of government tasks. Later work by Adler and Barnett documented how the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) shaped states’ collective identity.

### Regionalism

Geography, or the region of cooperating states, is another important factor for the design of IOs. The majority of IOs today are regional rather than universal in membership, and those regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) display a wide variety of design features.

Acharya and Johnston examine regional variation in institutional design beyond large Western organizations by integrating functionalist and sociological approaches. This research highlights the importance of cultural, domestic, and geopolitical characteristics for the degree of IO autonomy, legalization, decision-making, and sovereignty rules. For example, shared external threats can yield more intrusive regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN’s) Free Trade Area whereas low external threats combined with weak domestic leaders can result in the opposite. In the twentieth century, concerns over domestic regime survival in some regions have impeded attempts at weakening state sovereignty and have thus resulted in less IO autonomy in Africa and the Arab world than in Europe. This regionalism volume also provided support for earlier rational design conjectures, such as that uncertainty about the state of the world yields higher flexibility.


46 Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.*


A related literature has evaluated efforts to adopt IO designs for other regional integration projects. This research focuses primarily on the (attempted) diffusion of certain features of the European Union (EU) as templates for the African Union, ASEAN, and Mercosur. When institutional arrangements are adopted in new regions, it is often a result of both supply through EU promotion and demand by regional member states and nonstate stakeholders.

Regionalism research also highlights how IOs can “fail” despite the existence of self-interested benefits in cooperation. It underscores the importance of shared identity or culture for the decision between multilateral IOs and bilateral agreements. The absence of a NATO-equivalent in Asia, for example, can be explained by a combination of power, lack of perceived external threats, and lack of US identification with the region. Mutual identity—based on shared democracy, religion, and ethnicity—has shaped a more egalitarian, multilateral union with Europe (North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO) as compared with Asia (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: SEATO).

Redesign

Once IOs are designed, shifts in global politics or internal developments can lead to institutional change in the form of renegotiation, replacement, repurposing, or death. For example, for the turbulent decade between 1981 and 1992, about a third of the world’s 1,063 IOs and emanations from 1981 died or were reabsorbed by their parent bodies. International relations (IR) scholarship has taken a variety of approaches to address the question of institutional change. Indeed, part of Keohane’s original impetus for theorizing regimes was to explain changes in and across them—something hegemonic stability theory was unable to do given the slow-moving nature of hegemony. One enduring division in current literature is...
whether these changes are driven by state interests or by actors within IOs themselves (e.g., bureaucrats). Unfortunately, largely because much of the scholarship on IOs moved away from the study of actual organizations, scant attention has been paid to how organizations change after they are formed.

Nevertheless, several smaller bodies of literature on institutional change have emerged in recent years. One set argues that when IOs grow beyond their original purpose or become suboptimal solutions, member states may decide to renegotiate the scope of their international cooperation. A prominent example of renegotiation is the GATT, which evolved into the WTO after seven years of bargaining. This renegotiation extended not only the scope of the organization, but added a new, centralized dispute resolution mechanism which aims at increasing members’ compliance with their obligations and changing the penalties associated with noncompliance.\(^{56}\)

Instead of renegotiation, however, member states may also replace a defunct IO with a new organization that better reflects the current state of world politics in terms of political will. Two examples of this dynamic are the UN replacing the League of Nations and the Ottawa Convention replacing the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Cottrell argues that decisions to renegotiate rather than replace IOs are explained by legitimacy and problem definition: where contestation over the functioning of an existing institution leads to a redefinition of a problem, states will likely replace the institution (as opposed to redesign it).\(^ {57}\)

Several IOs have undergone changes in their mandate or purpose. For example, some predicted that NATO would wither away with the end of the Cold War because the threat constituting its purpose had faded away.\(^ {58}\) Instead, it broadened its membership beyond the former “iron curtain.”\(^ {59}\) NATO also expanded its scope from an alliance for self-defense to a cooperative security arrangement, managing conflict between its members and at its geographic periphery.\(^ {60}\) The IMF and


the World Bank are also good examples of repurposing. After the reconstruction of Europe following World War II, the World Bank shifted its focus to financing development projects in other parts of the world. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the IMF expanded its goals from reducing currency devaluations to providing development aid to poor countries with balance of payment issues.

IR research has also examined the viability of IGOs in terms of their durability and death. While the overall number of IOs has been steadily growing, death is not rare. Changes in international conflict, cooperation, and in the balance of power have direct implications for the viability of IOs. Changes in international conflict are associated with higher mortality rates of IOs, as in the run-up to both World Wars, during the decline of the United States as a hegemon after 1970, and at the end of the Cold War. Still, despite these empirical studies of organizational death, few studies have theorized the mechanisms by which states choose to shut down IOs.

In addition to world politics, some scholars have examined the importance of domestic politics and headquarters location for the survival of IOs. Regions with poorer and politically polarized countries (Africa, Middle East) experienced more IO death than other regions (Europe and Asia). In addition, the location of the institution’s headquarters matters by directly driving the availability of human capital for the institution’s staff. If an institution’s secretariat does not attract talented staff, it is more likely to die. This research also highlights the zone between life and death, where “zombie” IOs maintain some activities but suffer from budget and personnel problems and often fall short of their ambitions.

Deciding which IOs to Join or Act Through

Most early theories of IOs discuss their foundation: why do states form international organizations? Of course, the decision to join an IO is presumably different than the decision to form an IO, even if some of the factors behind these decisions are related. The literature reviewed here largely assumes there are extant IOs available to join.

Traditional Theories

Most power-based (e.g., hegemonic stability theory) and interest-based (e.g., neo-functionalism) theories purport to describe why institutions are formed. Yet, within the insights of some of these writings, one can also deduce why states might move to join existing IOs. Presumably, many of the logics of transaction costs, assisting collective action, providing information, and making credible commitments apply equally to states forming and joining IOs. It is worth noting, however, that much of the early scholarship (and even some recent scholarship) on IOs presumes that small states will be willing to join these institutions when formed by larger powers since the larger powers will provide collective goods and small powers can benefit from free-riding on their efforts. There is little sense that states that are not present at the creation may have variation in demand for IOs, either in terms of the number, form, or purpose of these institutions.

A unique power-based perspective on the question of joining is given by Lloyd Gruber, who argues that weaker states are essentially forced to join institutions with more powerful members because the latter possess what he labels “go it alone power.” That is, strong states can unilaterally change the status quo, with or without the assistance or approval of weaker states. Thus, the latter must join IOs so as not to be left behind by the march of international cooperation—according to Gruber—whether the agreements are beneficial or not.

Our main argument with respect to this group of theories is that the choice to form an IO or join an IO was largely treated as the same question for many years. It

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67 We borrow the description of theories as interest-, power-, or knowledge-based from Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes.

68 Snidal, “Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes.”

still largely is. Yet the costs of forming an IO versus joining an existing one are quite different; just as, in the security realm, starting, joining, or continuing a war are very different decisions. Our theories should be clearer on which decision (forming versus joining) they purport to explain.

The other way to conceptualize the question of joining is to focus on the organizational side: when do IOs expand? Here, the IO is taken as the unit of analysis. This presumes some independent power of IOs (or at least some aggregation of preferences among member states) and analyzes the conditions under which IOs will decide to admit new members. Mansfield and Pevehouse examine regional trade organizations and find that they tend to expand at similar times (as if in competition for members) and when there is a relatively uniform (economic) size distribution among the existing members. Clearly, more work should be done examining decisions to expand: such analyses force the scholar to take institutions as bureaucratic bodies and theorize about the politics within and between them (see later in this chapter).

**Domestic Politics**

Tremendous work has emerged in the last two decades linking domestic politics to decisions regarding IOs. Much of this work focuses on the ability of IOs to provide information to or tie the hands of domestic actors. Underlying the first process is an IO’s ability to collate information from a wide variety of members, but more importantly to be entrusted to aggregate this information in an unbiased manner. The foundation of the second process is an IO’s ability to solve the collective action problem in order to punish states that deviate from their commitments.

Work in both security studies and international political economy (IPE) has used the information-providing functions of IOs to build arguments around when states will join or use IOs to achieve particular goals. In the security realm, it has been argued that IOs provide legitimacy for proposed policies due to the nature of their operations. For example, resolutions issued by the UN General Assembly are often seen as legitimate due to its near universal membership and the one-state-one-vote system. More importantly, the UN Security Council can legitimize the use of force

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because the underlying rulemaking is perceived as legitimate.\textsuperscript{72} The Council represents the international community through the heterogeneity of its fifteen members in terms of state power, geography, and interests, as well as through its long history and delegated powers from the UN’s member states as a whole. By issuing a resolution, the Council can provide information about the coercing leader’s benign intention or limited ambitions\textsuperscript{73} and the likely policy consequences.\textsuperscript{74} As some of these studies suggest, UN Security Council approval can both inform domestic publics and legitimize the use of force or other punitive actions.

Similarly, IPE scholars contend that the information asymmetry between leaders and voters can be ameliorated through IOs. Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff argue that state leaders need a viable mechanism to signal their competence in economic matters to their electorate.\textsuperscript{75} Joining international economic organizations provides information to the populace: should a leader engage in rent-seeking behavior, the organization would presumably move to punish the leader for bad behavior. As a result, democratic states join international economic organizations to provide information about their type (honest versus rent-seeking) to their domestic populace. A related argument is made in the realm of the IMF, where some note that leaders may use IOs for the opposite purpose: to scapegoat unpopular policies.\textsuperscript{76}

In addition, changes in domestic political institutions can also give rise to incentives to join or utilize institutions. Specifically, Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse show that, consistent with Moravcsik, newly democratized states are more willing to join human rights institutions (IOs and treaties) than are long-standing democracies or authoritarian states.\textsuperscript{77} Perhaps more importantly, they show that new democracies are more willing to join IOs that impose higher

“sovereignty costs,”—that is, are more intrusive to domestic political actors. They argue that these costs both serve as a costly signal to domestic and international audiences as well as a binding legal commitment to uphold human rights.

With regards to the mechanism of credible, binding commitments, it has been shown that similarity of regime type has a strong effect on alliances. In particular, while there remains some debate about the exact nature of the relationship, several scholars have found democracies are more likely to ally (especially creating more formal defense pacts) with one another.\textsuperscript{78} Gaubatz shows that democracies tend to stay in alliances with one another for longer periods of time.\textsuperscript{79} Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel argue that domestic political coalitions influence the nature of alliance behavior for dictatorships, but not democracies.\textsuperscript{80}

As these alliance findings suggest, preference heterogeneity at the domestic level can serve as a block to acting through IOs more generally. In the realm of trade agreements, Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse have shown that the presence of institutionally empowered veto players can decrease the likelihood of agreements and the depth of agreements that do emerge.\textsuperscript{81} Minnich has shown empirically that the existence of more domestic veto players also limits commitments to international organizations.\textsuperscript{82} Clearly there is variation on the need to make binding commitments through IOs, but ironically, the field has now settled on theoretically indeterminate arguments: democracies, because of regular turnover, can benefit from these commitments, but so can dictatorships, who have poor reputations for keeping commitments.

\textbf{Forum-Shopping}

A recent innovation in research on the question of joining IOs involves the concept of forum-shopping. Given a menu of forums for states to achieve their goals, what


determines the choice of forum? In the past decade, more scholarship has emerged on this question. In the trade realm, Busch shows that states will choose the forum that not only will result in an outcome most favorable to them, but also will set the most significant precedent, so that states can use similar strategies in the future with regard to other members of the agreement.83

Alter and Meunier identify regime complexity as a key source of variation in state behavior with regard to which IOs states use to accomplish their goals.84 They argue, and a number of empirical studies using their framework confirm, that overlapping institutions lead to issues of implementation (e.g., rule ambiguity and legal fragmentation), allow for cross-institutional political strategies such as forum-shopping, and produce competition effects which can lead to a lack of institutional innovation.85 Relatedly, in the area of international human rights institutions, Helfer documents a growing number of instances where individuals raise identical claims in front of different courts, suggesting strategic behavior on the part of individual litigants.86

Despite the important work done by Alter, Meunier, Busch, and others, far more theoretical and empirical work is needed to consider the factors that drive states to join or use IOs rather than form them.87 Indeed, the processes may be highly related and some of the workhorse theories of IO formation (neofunctionalism, regime theory, etc.) may easily adapt to decisions to join. But given that states now have a large menu of IOs to join, each with distinct rules and members, it is likely that calculations about membership are fundamentally different for IO originators from IO joiners.

Operating IOs

From the rise of neofunctionalism until the 1990s, the majority of IO scholarship focused on questions of creation, treating the resulting organizations as black boxes. This clearly followed from the systemic emphasis in IR theory at the time.

85 Ibid.
As Kratochwil and Ruggie showed nearly thirty years ago, research in the journal *International Organization* moved significantly away from the study of formal organizations and their operation to more general studies of IOs. A review of the pages of *International Organization* today would likely show that little has changed.

Yet, if IOs have agency, this makes them independent actors on the world stage, and the preferences of the IO itself (or the actors who run it) must be taken into account to explain outcomes. If IO preferences matter, we require a model of how those preferences come to be, whose preferences within the organizations matter, and how they are exercised in everyday IO activities. In this section, we briefly review new work that examines the operation of international organizations where the dependent variables considered are the behaviors within the organizations.

**Bureaucratic Politics**

Despite the popularity of organizational theory in economics and sociology, relatively few IR scholars have used these theories to understand the functioning of IOs. An important exception to this rule are Barnett and Finnemore, who argue that IOs can fall victim to bureaucratic politics by implementing one-size-fits-all approaches without considering context, becoming subject to intraorganizational clashes, and becoming insulated from states. This can give rise to IO autonomy and power independent of the states that created the organization. When IO behavior goes as far as to undermine its own mission, it has been labeled as dysfunctional and as demonstrating “pathologies.” These risks are especially high for larger organizations such as the UN. In addition, a number of scholars have shown that bureaucrats can, due to a variety of mechanisms, transform their own institutions, quite apart from state interests.

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Combining issues of the bureaucratic operation of IOs and design questions, Johnson and Urpelainen have argued that it is essential to understand the preferences and behavior of bureaucrats when considering the design of emanations—IOs created by other IOs. Specifically, they show that bureaucrats can design new IOs independently of the founding states even if it is known that bureaucrats’ preferences are not close to those of their state masters. Johnson shows through a new data set of emanations that more insulation of bureaucrats gives them a freer hand in designing new institutions. Other studies, however, suggest that preferences of key actors and staff within organizations can be directly shaped by member states—a position held by Stone regarding the IMF. Stone argues that there is little independence of the IMF staff with regards to lending in Africa: they largely work at the behest of their large state donors, lacking independence. Copelovitch has reached a similar conclusion but through the use of a common agency model—IMF staff are highly responsive to member states that are highly exposed creditors. Yet, Copelovitch shows that the IMF staff do play some role in determining the nature of IMF lending.

Intergovernmentalism

In contrast to the idea that bureaucratic interests are key to understanding the operation of IOs, intergovernmentalist theories argue that IO operation hinges strongly on cooperation from member state governments—or “obstinate” nation-states—which can obstruct cooperation by pursuing their national interests. The primary examples of intergovernmentalism in the EU are its Empty Chair Crisis in 1965 and long unresolved negotiations toward a common foreign and security policy. For such a sensitive “high politics” issue, integration is much harder to achieve than in traditional “low politics” areas like economics. Thus integration is driven by domestic preferences to delegate certain issues to the EU in the first place as well as the

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97 Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” *Daedalus* 95 (1966): 862–915.
relative bargaining power of member states and their ability to leverage issue linkage and side payments.  

Regional hegemons, such as Germany in the EU and the United States in NAFTA, can also facilitate institutional operations by solving coordination problems. Among EU institutions, the Council of Ministers and the European Council most clearly embody intergovernmentalism because they directly represent national governments whose support is critical for passing legislation. Other examples of intergovernmentalist institutions are Mercosur as well as the WTO. Interestingly, the pendulum on questions of IO operations has swung away from states. It now appears that scholars consistently look for (and find) limits to state power in many IOs. It is as yet unclear, however, whether this bureaucratic power is a result of design, the indifference of states, agency slack, or some combination of all three. Moreover, per the intergovernmentalist crowd, it is not clear that if push comes to shove, states cannot reassert control over organizations. A case like the European financial crisis should be a hard test for those arguing for the limited power of states.

NGOs

Finally, increasing numbers of scholars are also examining how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or, more broadly, transnational actors influence the operation of IOs. There is wide variation among IOs regarding the access granted to NGO actors and this variation is the source of a growing body of research. Access is a key variable to consider given the assumption that the reason NGOs desire access to these IOs is to alter policies from the status quo.

100 McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War.”
NGOs can attempt to influence the politics of IOs in a variety of ways. One is through an information mechanism whereby IO bureaucrats (and potential states) are informed of citizens’ preferences through NGOs. Of course, IOs themselves may tap NGOs for information and expertise as well, especially in particular issue areas or to help with monitoring. Another mechanism whereby NGOs can change outcomes is through influencing the design of IOs or their emanations.

Research on IGO–NGO partnerships in matters of global governance on a host of issues is expanding rapidly. Recently, Jessica Green has argued that nonstate actors have played a key role in global environmental governance through the delegation of authority from traditional state rulemakers. We would join with Tallberg and associates, however, in a cautionary note: like the beginnings of many projects, the quest for discovering patterns of when NGOs matter has begun with finding episodes of when NGOs matter. Far more additional work remains to be done concerning how NGOs matter, the conditions under which NGOs matter, and the limits placed on them by IOs or member states.

Outcomes

The question of whether IOs achieve their intended goals has been the most hotly debated topic concerning international institutions. The issue has received much attention in the last decade, although previous generations of scholars focused on this important question as well. Unlike World War II-era scholars, more recent

103 Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.), NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).
108 Tallberg et al., “Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations.”
studies contend that most states comply with their international treaties most of the time.\textsuperscript{112} However, the causes of (non-) compliance and its remedies are contested issues.

Scholars have tended to fall into either of two camps.\textsuperscript{113} The managerial school maintains that compliance with treaties is generally a safe assumption and any non-compliance is a result of capacity issues.\textsuperscript{114} The enforcement school, on the other hand, argues that states select those institutions that require little policy adjustment from current behavior, leading to strategic self-selection (“screening”) of members into treaties, resulting in shallow cooperation.\textsuperscript{115}

Because Dunoff (see Chapter 3 of this volume) covers much of this debate on compliance as an outcome, we proceed with our review of this area assuming that IOs have some influence on state behavior. The question remains: which areas and which behaviors? The first section addresses the former through the lens of domestic politics, while the second section examines effects in the security and trade realm. The final section examines what we call side effects or unintended consequences.

**Effects on Domestic Politics**

Much research has explored the effect of IOs on state behavior, examining the conditions under which, and mechanisms through which, IOs can induce policy change at the domestic level (convergence/divergence). This scholarship has focused on several issue areas and has revealed the importance of externalities to state behavior, IO design, and domestic politics.\textsuperscript{116} Here we review a few topics where recent scholarship has expanded in this field, often labeled as the “second-image reversed.”\textsuperscript{117}


\textsuperscript{114} Chayes and Chayes, “On Compliance.”


Of particular interest to human rights scholars is the effect of the UN on states’ human rights performance. However, empirical evaluation of the effect of UN treaties on states’ compliance with human rights standards has produced mixed results. Some scholars have found that UN treaties have zero or even a negative effect on human rights, primarily due to the UN’s lack of enforcement mechanism. Other scholars have demonstrated that human rights treaties exert a positive effect on states’ behavior in the aggregate, although less so in the case of torture. Still others conclude that the effect of the UN is conditional on issue linkage, the specific rights in question, as well as on a country’s regime type and existing respect for human rights. Finally, some claim that human rights norms just take longer to manifest themselves through moral persuasion.

Scholarship on the effect of IOs on democratization has largely focused on the EU, though other regional organizations have also been considered. Many studies find that IOs can support democratization efforts in candidacy states through material inducements like membership conditionality and by being a vehicle for states’ credible commitment to democratic reform. In addition to potential

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126 Pevehouse, “With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy”; Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democratization, Credible Commitments, and Joining International...
member states, some scholars examine the EU’s effect on democratization beyond its borders.\textsuperscript{127} There is also growing evidence that a variety of IOs can have positive effects on the quality of elections, specifically reducing fraud, by monitoring a state’s compliance with international electoral standards.\textsuperscript{128}

Scholarship on multilateral foreign aid is vast and provides quite mixed assessments about the effect of such aid on development. Most of the recent literature on foreign aid examines the effect of official development assistance, which includes contributions from the World Bank, the IMF, and other multilateral organizations such as development banks. Only a handful of efforts examine the effect of the World Bank or IMF per se.\textsuperscript{129} For example, some scholars find that IMF programs have perverse effects, hurting economic growth and increasing income inequality.\textsuperscript{130} While there is consensus that the IMF helped states with balance of payment problems, it often remains unclear whether this positive effect is due to high state compliance with IMF regulations or the IMF loan itself.\textsuperscript{131} This field is rich in opportunities for future research to examine the effect and mechanisms by which specific IO policies impact development, especially as new data on multilateral lending have become available. Thanks to these and other data, a growing number of studies now examine the politics of multilateral development-assistance efforts and their outcomes on development, the environment, and conflict.\textsuperscript{132}


Effects on International Security and Trade

In contrast to human rights, the material externalities of state behavior are high in the realms of security and trade. As suggested by Keohane and Martin, in collaboration games IOs can aid monitoring and enforcement (e.g., through reciprocity or inducements), which reduces the short-term gains from defection and thus helps states capture the long-term gains of cooperation.\(^{133}\)

In coordination games with distributional conflicts,\(^{134}\) several prominent scholars have argued that IOs can provide a focal point for and information about compliance of partner states\(^{135}\) as well as policy intentions and potential policy outcomes.\(^{136}\)

For example, research has found that NATO can reduce conflict among its members by increasing trust\(^ {137}\) and also alleviate external conflicts through humanitarian interventions.\(^ {138}\) Similarly, as a neutral body within the UN system, the International Atomic Energy Agency has promoted information-sharing about the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons through inspections, and has provided technical assistance to peaceful nuclear programs.\(^ {139}\)

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\(^{133}\) Keohane, *After Hegemony: Power and Discord in International Politics*; Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.”


\(^{138}\) Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.”

Similar examples exist outside the security field. Many scholars have examined the success of the WTO in promoting international trade, despite the IO’s lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism. Scholarship has focused on the way the WTO incentivizes the reduction of barriers to trade through reciprocity and non-discrimination in trade policy. The WTO also provides information about state behavior (noncompliance), offers a dispute settlement mechanism, and reduces export volatility. More recently, scholars have disaggregated the WTO’s effect on states’ trade by looking at specific sectors, states’ attributes, and aspects of WTO accession.

Comparatively less scholarly attention in IPE has been paid to regional economic organizations, such as ASEAN, Mercosur, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Existing studies suggest that regional IOs’ effect on trade varies widely, that it may be conditional on military alliances, and that trade levels and IO design may be endogenous. Other studies have focused on nontrade outcomes, showing that these regional arrangements can increase foreign direct investment and lower military conflict.


Side-Effects: Unintended Consequences

Finally, a growing number of scholars are now examining the unintended consequences of IO behavior. Partly as a result of the functionalist motivation, most scholarship on the effects of IOs has examined whether the organization fulfills its stated goals. While this research has enhanced our understanding of anticipated effects, it overlooks the unanticipated and unintended consequences of cooperation. Some early research did address unanticipated (surprising) and potentially costly side-effects of ECJ power.

More recent studies have turned to unintended consequences. Some of these unintended consequences are positive, such as the role of preferential trade agreements in enforcing human rights, judicial activism in international courts, and UN Security Council membership's indirect effect on aid flows.

However, other unintended effects are negative. These include the effect of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs on human rights and civil strife; the effect of IO election monitoring on governance and risks of violence; the effect of peacekeeping on both violence and sex tourism; and the effect of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism on the success of developing countries in the settlement process.

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CONCLUSION

The subject of international organizations and world politics continues to involve discussions of the central issues in the field of international relations. The subject involves questions of how states confront issues including trade, finance, the environment, human rights, foreign aid, and security. As data on these issues has continued to proliferate, as growing numbers of scholars investigate IOs, and as theoretical refinements continue to mark the field, the subject will remain at the center of IR.

This chapter has attempted to outline some of the debates and issues in this field. While we have attempted to cover many literatures, we inevitably made choices about what to include. Even in this limited review, we identified many areas where extant work has only scratched the surface of how IOs matter in world politics.

Unfortunately, until quite recently, the IR field spent far too much time on the arcane debate over whether IOs mattered or were epiphenomenal to international outcomes. Even if IOs do not exert a strong influence on state behavior, we must still account for why most states belong to many hundreds of these organizations. This suggests that, at a minimum, we must couch questions about IO efficacy in terms of the conditions under which they matter or do not, rather than a wholesale rejection of their worth.

To make progress on this question of conditions, there are still several avenues of research that we believe must be pursued, three of which we flagged in our review. First, the field must continue to embrace treating organizations as organizations. While the move away from this was certainly understandable many years ago (there were few efforts to create generalizable theory from single-organization studies), to truly understand the nature of decisions regarding delegation, bureaucratic politics, (re)design, and questions of intersubjective problem definition, one must delve within particular organizations. Yet, scholars must be mindful that studies of particular organizations must be generalizable.

Second, and related, those scholars who do have a particular institutional focus tend to select one of a very few big organizations. Studies of the GATT/WTO, IMF, World Bank, EU, and UN far outnumber studies of other organizations. While these are the key organizations in international relations, our theories of IOs may be unduly informed by these five organizations rather than the other 1,000-plus in operation. This limited focus also leaves out the various informal organizations that influence world politics.159 And while this should not be taken as a call to arms to

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study the African Groundnut Council, if the ultimate goal is to understand when, why, and how IOs matter for international relations, there are certainly lessons to be drawn from numerous other organizations.

Third, numerous new data sets are becoming available to researchers. Whether it is data on membership, emanations,\footnote{Johnson, “Institutional Design and Bureaucrats’ Impact on Political Control.”} multilateral aid projects,\footnote{Michael J. Tierney et al., “More Dollars than Sense: Refining our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData,” \textit{World Development} 39 (2011): 1891–906.} NGOs and their relations with IOs,\footnote{Tallberg et al., “Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations.”} or informal organizations,\footnote{Vabulas and Snidal, “Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements.”} researchers can now answer numerous questions through large-N studies. Yet, it should not be forgotten (as with any data set) that the theory that inspired data collection influences the questions that can be asked. Some data will be more or less appropriate for any particular researcher’s questions. And, as with all observational data, traditional concerns of causal inference must be addressed.

Finally, in presenting our view of the field as a chronological view of the stages of state decisions concerning IOs, we wish to emphasize that each stage is not independent. Indeed, the core analytical difficulty in the study of IOs is that if one anticipates answers to the last questions concerning IO efficacy, it can influence decisions on all previous questions, including whether to form the institutions at all and strategic interactions between states and IOs.\footnote{von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance: Who Seeks and Receives Technical Election Assistance?”} This is the true theoretical and empirical challenge of determining when, why, and how IOs matter for international relations—if states and leaders can anticipate outcomes, this will inform their choices as to cooperation, design, forum choice, and monitoring of IO behavior. This assumes, however, that leaders look down the game tree and can do so in an informed manner. As constructivist and critical theorists have long held, such calculations may give too much credit to leaders and assume too much about the role of the logic of consequences. Yet, even for those who relax strong assumptions about rationality, the interdependence of decisions about means and ends is consequential.

The study of international organizations will continue to be fertile ground for many of the key ideas in the study of international politics. Through continued theoretical and empirical progress, scholars can continue to shed light on some of the key questions involving conflict and cooperation in the world.